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ABSTRACT
Audit studies testing for discrimination have been criticized because applicants from different groups
may not appear identical to employers.  Correspondence studies address this criticism by using fictitious
paper applicants whose qualifications can be made identical across groups.  However, Heckman and
Siegelman (1993) show that group differences in the variance of unobservable determinants of productivity
can still generate spurious evidence of discrimination in either direction.  This paper shows how to
recover an unbiased estimate of discrimination when the correspondence study includes variation in
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I. Introduction  
In audit or correspondence studies, fictitious individuals who are identical except for 
race, sex, or ethnicity apply for jobs.  Group differences in outcomes – for example, blacks 
getting fewer job offers than whites – are interpreted as reflecting discrimination.  Across a wide 
array of countries and demographic groups, audit or correspondence studies find evidence 
consistent with discrimination, including discrimination against blacks, Hispanics, and women in 
the United States (Mincy 1993; Neumark 1996; Bertrand and Mullainathan [BM] 2004), 
Moroccans in Belgium and the Netherlands (Smeeters and Nayer 1998; Bovenkerk, Gras, and 
Ramsoedh 1995), and lower castes in India (Banerjee et al. 2008).  These “field experiments” are 
widely viewed as providing the most convincing evidence on discrimination (Pager 2007; Riach 
and Rich 2002), and U.S. courts allow organizations that conduct audit or correspondence studies 
to file claims of discrimination based on the evidence they collect (U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 1996).  Yet audit or correspondence studies have been sharply 
criticized by Heckman and Siegelman [HS] (HS 1993; Heckman 1998).  Perhaps the most 
damaging criticism is that when the variance of unobserved productivity differs across groups – 
as in the standard statistical discrimination model (Aigner and Cain 1977) – audit or 
correspondence studies can generate spurious evidence of discrimination in either direction or of 
its absence; equivalently, discrimination is unidentified in these studies.  Although this critique 
has been ignored in the literature, it clearly casts serious doubt on the validity of the evidence 
from these studies.  This paper addresses the unobserved variance critique of audit and 
correspondence studies, proposing a method of collecting and analyzing data from these studies 
that can correctly identify discrimination.   
The HS criticism that has received the most attention is that audit studies – which use 
“live” job applicants – fail to ensure that applicants from different groups appear identical to  
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employers.  Many of these criticisms can be countered by using correspondence studies, which 
use fictitious applicants on paper, or more recently the internet, whose qualifications can be 
made identical across groups.  However, the Heckman and Siegelman (1993) critique applies 
even in the ideal case in which both observed and unobserved group averages are identical.   
This paper develops and implements a method of using data from audit or 
correspondence studies that accomplishes two goals.  First, it provides a statistical test of 
whether HS’s unobservable variance critique applies to the data from a particular study.  Second, 
and more important, it develops a statistical estimation procedure that identifies the effect of 
discrimination.  The method requires the study to have variation in applicant characteristics that 
affect hiring.  It is a simple matter to collect the requisite data in future correspondence studies, 
and as an illustration the method is implemented using data from a correspondence study (BM 
2004) that has the requisite data.   
The method rests on three types of assumptions.  First, it is based on an assumed binary 
threshold model of hiring that asks whether the perceived productivity of a worker exceeds a 
standard.  Second, it imposes a parametric assumption about the distribution of unobservables 
that is necessary for identification in this case.  The model and parametric assumption parallel 
exactly the setting used by HS to interpret data from these types of studies; but there may of 
course be other contexts where this method is useful.  Finally, to solve the identification problem 
highlighted by HS, it relies on an additional identifying assumption that some applicant 
characteristics affect the perceived productivity of workers, and hence hiring, and that the effects 
of these characteristics on perceived productivity do not vary with group membership (for 
example, race).  This identifying assumption has testable implications in the form of 




II. Background on Audit and Correspondence Studies  
Earlier research on labor market discrimination focused on individual-level employment 
or earnings regressions, with discrimination estimated from the race, sex, or ethnic differential 
that remains unexplained after including many proxies for productivity.  These analyses suffer 
from the obvious criticism that the proxies do not adequately capture group differences in 
productivity, in which case the “unexplained” differences cannot be interpreted as 
discrimination.   
Audit or correspondence studies are a response to this inherent weakness of the 
regression approach to discrimination.  These studies are based on comparisons of outcomes 
(usually job interviews or job offers) for matched job applicants differing by race, sex, or 
ethnicity (see, for example, Turner, Fix, and Struyk 1991; Neumark 1996; BM 2004).  Audit or 
correspondence studies directly address the problem of missing data on productivity.  Rather 
than trying to control for variables that might be associated with productivity differences 
between groups, these studies instead create an artificial pool of job applicants, among whom 
there are intended to be no average differences by group.  By using either applicants coached to 
act alike, with identical-quality resumes (an audit study), or simply applicants on paper who have 
equal qualifications (a correspondence study), the method is largely immune to criticisms of 
failure to control for important differences between, for example, black and white job applicants.  
As a consequence, this strategy has come to be widely used in testing for discrimination in labor 
markets (as well as housing markets).  Thorough reviews are contained in Fix and Struyk (1993), 
Riach and Rich (2002), and Pager (2007).   
Despite the widely-held view that audit or correspondence studies are the best way to test 
for labor market discrimination, critiques of these studies challenge their conclusions (HS 1993; 
Heckman 1998).  Many of these criticisms have been acknowledged by researchers as potentially  
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valid, and subsequent research has adapted.  For example, HS noted that in the prominent audit 
studies carried out by the Urban Institute (for example, Mincy 1993), white and minority testers 
were told, during their training, about “the pervasive problem of discrimination in the United 
States,” raising the possibility that testers subconsciously took actions in their job interviews that 
led to the “expected” result (HS 1993).  A constructive response to this criticism has been the 
move to correspondence studies, which focus on applications on paper and whether they result in 
job interviews, thus cutting out the influence of the individual job applicants used in the test. 
However, a fundamental critique of audit or correspondence studies has not been 
addressed by researchers.  In particular, HS consider what most researchers view as the ideal 
conditions for an audit or correspondence study – when not only are the observable average 
differences between groups eliminated, but in addition the observable characteristics used in the 
applications are sufficiently rich that it is reasonable to assume that potential employers believe 
there are no average differences in unobservable characteristics across groups.  HS show that, 
even in this case, audit or correspondence studies can generate evidence of discrimination (in 
either direction) when there is none, and can also mask evidence of discrimination when it in fact 
exists.  Given the pervasive use of audit and correspondence studies, the failure of any research 
to address this critique is a significant gap in the social science and legal literature.   
III. The Heckman-Siegelman Critique  
  I first set up the analytical framework that parallels the one used in HS’s critique of 
evidence from audit and correspondence studies.  This framework is used to illustrate the 
problem of identifying discrimination when there are group differences in the variance of 
unobservables.  Then, in the following section, I show how discrimination can be identified in 
this setting.  
Suppose that productivity depends on two individual characteristics, X’ = (X
I,X
II).  Let R  
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be a dummy for race, with R = 1 for minorities and 0 for non-minorities (which I will refer to as 
“black” and “white” for short).  Allow productivity also to depend on a firm-level characteristic 
F, so that productivity is P(X’,F).  Let the treatment of a worker depending on P and possibly R 
(if there is discrimination) be denoted T(P(X’,F),R).  For now, think of this treatment as 
continuous, even though that is not the usual outcome for an audit or correspondence study; 
suppose the treatment is, for example, the wage offered, set equal to a worker’s productivity 
minus a possible discriminatory penalty for blacks as in Becker’s (1971) employer taste 
discrimination model.   
Define discrimination as 
(1)  T(P(X’,F)|R = 1) ≠ T(P(X’,F)|R = 0). 
 
Assume that P(.,.) and T(P(.,.)) are additive, so 
(2)  P(X’,F) = βI’X
I + X
II + F  
(3)  T(P(X’,F),R) = P + γ’R.
1 
Thus, discrimination against blacks implies that γ’ < 0, so that blacks are paid less than 
equally-productive whites at the same firm. 
In an audit or correspondence study, two testers (or applications) or multiple pairs of 
testers (one with R = 1 and one with R = 0 in each pair) are sent to firms to apply for jobs.  The 
researcher attempts to standardize their productivity based on observable productivity-related 
characteristics.  Denote expected productivity for blacks and whites, based on the productivity-
related characteristics that the firm observes, as PB
* and PW
*; these are not necessarily based on 
both X
I and X
II, as we may want to treat X
II as unobserved by firms.  The goal of the audit or 
correspondence study design is to set PB
* = PW
*.  Given these observables, the outcome T is 
observed for each tester.  So based on Equation 3, each test – thought of as the outcome of 











*, then averaging across tests yields an estimate of γ’.  In this case, we can also 
estimate the mean difference between the outcome T for blacks and white by a regression of T 
on a constant and the race dummy, or  
(5)  T(R) = α’ + γ’Ri + εi 
where the first argument of T(.,.) is suppressed because it is assumed the same for all applicants.
2   
Now consider explicitly the two components of productivity, X
I and X
II.  Suppose the 
audit or correspondence study controls only X
I in the resumes or interviews.
3 Denote by XB
j and 
XW
j the values of X
I and X
II for blacks and whites, j = I, II.  Suppose that the audit or 
correspondence study, as is usually done, sets XB
I = XW
I; the level at which they are set is later 
denoted as X
I*, the level at which X
I is “standardized” across applicants.  Then for the test 










II) + F. 
(For simplicity, I suppress the conditioning on XB
I or XW
I.  Both Pk
* and E(Xk
II), k = B, W, can 
be interpreted as conditional on Xk
I.) 




* + γ’ − PW
* = βI’XB
I + E(XB
II) + γ’ − (βI’XW
I + E(XW
II))  
   = γ’ + E(XB
II) − E(XW
II). 
Clearly observations from a sample of such tests identify γ’ only if E(XB
II) = E(XW
II).  
Thus, a key assumption in an audit or correspondence study is that all productivity-related 
factors not controlled for in the test have the same mean for blacks and whites.  Heckman (1998) 
and HS (1993), in critiques unrelated to the focus of this paper (group differences in the variance  
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of unobservables), offer a detailed discussion of the reasons why this assumption might be 
violated in audit studies.  Specifically, despite researchers’ best efforts to standardize applicants, 
differences remain that may be observed by employers.  And HS further show that even when 
these differences are weakly related to productivity, they can lead to large biases, precisely 
because the applicants are standardized on other productivity-related characteristics.  Moreover, 
the design of an audit study allows for experimenter effects that can – through information 
conveyed to employers in the job interview – generate differences between E(XB
II) and E(XW
II).  
Correspondence studies are a response to these criticisms of audit studies (see, for 
example, BM, p. 994).  In contrast to audit studies, they do not entail face-to-face interviews that 
might convey mean differences on uncontrolled variables between blacks and whites, and hence 
the researcher can eliminate differences observed by employers that are not controlled in the 
study.  In addition, a correspondence study, by its very nature, avoids potential experimenter 
effects.   
  Even in a correspondence study, though, differences in employer estimates of mean 
unobserved characteristics for blacks and whites can affect the results, as in Equation 8.  The 
difference, in this case, is one of interpretation, and even when this possibility arises, 
correspondence studies still have an important advantage.  Regarding interpretation, because 
employers are not allowed to make assumptions about race or sex differences in characteristics 
not observed in the job application or interview process (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, n.d.), any role of assumed mean differences in characteristics in affecting the 
outcomes from a correspondence study can be interpreted as statistical discrimination.  
Consequently, we can interpret the estimate of the expression in Equation 8 from a 
correspondence study as capturing the combined effects of taste discrimination (γ’) and statistical 
discrimination (E(XB
II) − E(XW
II)).  But in a correspondence study, the estimate of the combined  
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effects of the two types of discrimination is still more reliable than in an audit study, because of 
the absence of experimenter effects.   
In other words, correspondence studies succeed, where audit studies may fail, in 
providing unbiased estimates of what the law recognizes as discrimination.  However, they are 
not necessarily better at isolating taste discrimination.  Nonetheless, when a correspondence 
study includes a rich set of applicant characteristics, it becomes less likely that statistical 
discrimination plays much of a role in group differences in outcomes.
4 
Turning to the main focus of this paper, HS show that a more troubling result emerges in 
audit or correspondence studies because the relevant treatment is not linear in productivity as it 
might be for a wage offer, but instead is non-linear.  That is, we think that in the hiring process 
firms evaluate a job applicant’s productivity relative to a standard, and offer the applicant a job 
(or an interview) if the standard is met.  In this case, HS show that, even when there are equal 
group averages of both observed and unobserved variables, an audit or correspondence study can 
generate biased estimates, with spurious evidence of discrimination in either direction, or of its 
absence – or, in other words, discrimination is unidentified.  Because this critique applies even to 
correspondence studies, which meet higher standards of validity, the remainder of the discussion 
refers exclusively to correspondence studies. 
The intuitive basis of the HS critique is as follows.  Consider the simplest case in which 
E(XB
j) = E(XW
j), j = I, II, and the only difference between blacks and whites is that the variance 
of unobserved productivity is higher for whites than for blacks, for example.  The 
correspondence study controls for one productivity-related characteristic, X
I, and standardizes on 
a quite low value of X
I (that is, the study makes the two groups equal on characteristic X
I, but at 
a low value X
I*).  The correspondence study does not convey any information on a second, 
unobservable productivity-related characteristic, X
II.  Because an employer will offer a job  
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interview only if it perceives or expects the sum βI’X
I + X
II to be sufficiently high, when X
I* is 
set at a low level the employer has to believe that X
II is high (or likely to be high) in order to 
offer an interview.  Even though the employer does not observe X
II, if the employer knows that 
the variance of X
II is higher for whites, the employer correctly concludes that whites are more 
likely than blacks to have a sufficiently high sum of βI’X
I + X
II, by virtue of the simple fact that 
fewer blacks have very high values of X
II.  Employers will therefore be less likely to offer jobs to 
blacks than to whites, even though the observed average of X
I is the same for blacks and whites, 
as is the unobserved average of X
II.  The opposite holds if the standardization is at a high value 
of X
I; in the latter case the employer only needs to avoid very low values of X
II, which will be 
more common for the higher-variance whites.   
The idea that the variances of unobservables differ across groups has a long tradition in 
research on discrimination, stemming from early models of statistical discrimination.  For 
example, Aigner and Cain (1977) discuss these models and suggest that a higher variance of 
unobservables for blacks compared to whites is plausible, and Lundberg and Startz (1983) study 
how such an assumption can lead to an equilibrium with lower investment in human capital by 
blacks.  On the other hand, Neumark (1999) finds no evidence that employers have better labor 
market information about whites than blacks, and if anything the estimates – although imprecise 
– indicate the opposite.  
To see the bias formally, suppose that a job offer or interview is given if a worker’s 
perceived productivity exceeds a certain threshold c’.  As before, suppose that P is determined as 
a linear sum of X
I, X
II, and F (Equation 2), with X
II (and F) statistically independent of X
I.
5  The 
hiring rules for blacks and whites (with the possibility of discrimination) are  
(9)  T(P(X
I*,XB
II)|R = 1) = 1 if βI’X
I* + XB
II + γ’ + F > c’ 
 
(9’)      T(P(X
I*,XW
II)|R = 0) = 1 if βI’X
I* + XW
II + F > c’.  
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Discrimination may lead employers to “discount” the productivity of a black worker, as 
captured in γ’.   
To get to an econometric specification, assume that the unobservables XB
II and XW
II are 
normally distributed, with equal means (set to zero, without loss of generality), and standard 
deviations σB
II and σW
II.  Finally, as long as the firm-specific productivity shifters F are normally 
distributed and independent of X
II, and because they have the same distribution for blacks and 
whites, we can ignore them and focus solely on the unobserved variation in X
II (effectively 
redefining the random variable in what follows as X
II + F).  Under these assumptions, the 
probabilities that blacks and whites get hired are 
(10)     Pr[T(P(X
I*,XB
II)|R = 1) = 1] = 1 − Φ[(c’  − βI’X
I* − γ’)/σB
II] =  Φ[( βI’X
I* + γ’ – c’)/σB
II] 
(10’)   Pr[T(P(X
I*,XW
II) |R = 0) = 1] = 1 − Φ[(c’  −  βI’X
I*)/σW
II] =  Φ[( βI’X
I* − c’)/σW
II],  
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function.   
There is a potential difference between audit and correspondence studies in terms of how 
we might think about what is observable to the econometrician and the firm.  In an audit study, 
the simplest characterization might by that both the firm and the econometrician observe XB
I and 
XW
I, but the firm also observes XB
II and XW
II.  In a correspondence study, however, both the firm 
and the econometrician observe only XB
I and XW
I, with no variation in XB
II and XW
II observed by 
employers.  However, the distinction between audit and correspondence studies is not quite this 
sharp, because even though an employer interviews an applicant in an audit study, some (perhaps 
many) determinants of productivity remain unobserved when a job offer is made.   
This issue is relevant to thinking about how we arrive at a statistical model of hiring, such 
as the probit specifications in Equations 10 and 10’.  In an audit study, variables unobserved by 
the econometrician but observed by the firm can generate variation in hiring.  In a 
correspondence study, however, if firms observe only XB
I and XW
I, then the decision about who  
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to hire should be deterministic.  Given XB
I and XW
I (assumed equal), the employer hires the 
higher variance group if the level of standardization is low, and vice versa, so all firms 
evaluating identical job applicants should make the same decisions about hiring whites and 
blacks.  One way to introduce unobservables that generate random variation, with variances that 
differ by race as above, is to assume that there are random productivity differences across firms 
that are multiplicative in the unobserved productivity of a worker.  In that case, the differences in 
the variances of XB
II and XW
II map directly into unobservables that vary across firms with 
relative variances proportional to the relative variances of XB
II and XW
II.  Alternatively, 
employers may make expectational errors and rather than assigning a zero expectation to the 
unobservable assign a random draw based on the distribution of unobservables.   
Returning to the main line of argument, the difference between Equations 10 and 10’ – 
the success rates for black and white job applicants – is intended to be informative about 
discrimination.  However, even if γ’ = 0, so there is no discrimination, these two expressions 
need not be equal because σB
II and σW
II, the standard deviations of XB
II and XW
II, can be unequal.  
The earlier intuition about relative variance of the unobservables and the level of standardization 
of X
I can be made more precise.  Consider the earlier case with γ’ = 0, but σW
II > σB
II.  Then if 
X
I* is set at a low level – that is, the standardization level is low – characterized by βI’X
I* < c’, 
σW
II > σB
II implies that Φ[( βI’X
I* + γ’ – c’)/σB
II] < Φ[( βI’X
I* − c’)/σW
II], generating spurious 
evidence of discrimination against blacks.  When βI’X
I* > c’, we instead get spurious evidence of 




6   
Thus, even if the means of the unobserved productivity-related variables are the same for 
each group, and firms use the same hiring standard (that is, γ’ = 0), correspondence studies can  
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generate evidence consistent with discrimination against blacks (or, alternatively, in their favor).  
Although demonstrated in the case of normally distributed unobservables, the argument holds for 
symmetric distributions (Heckman 1998).  This is the basis for HS’s claim that even under ideal 
conditions correspondence (or audit) studies are uninformative about discrimination.   
IV. Detecting Discrimination  
With the right data from a correspondence study, the framework from the preceding 
section can be used to recover an unbiased estimate of discrimination, conditional on an 
identifying assumption.  The intuition is as follows.  The HS critique rests on differences 
between blacks and whites in the variances of unobserved productivity.  The fundamental 
problem, as Equations 10 and 10’ show, is that we cannot separately identify the effect of race 
(γ’) and a difference in the variance of the unobservables (σB
II/σW
II).  But a higher variance for 
one group (say, whites) implies a smaller effect of observed characteristics on the probability 
that a white applicant meets the standard for hiring.  Thus, information from a correspondence 
study on how variation in observable qualifications is related to employment outcomes can be 
informative about the relative variance of the unobservables, and this, in turn, can identify the 
effect of discrimination.  Based on this idea, the identification problem is solved by invoking an 
identifying assumption – specifically, that there is variation in some applicant characteristics in 
the study that affect perceived productivity and have effects that are homogeneous across the 
races.   
More formally, Equations 10 and 10’ imply that the difference in outcomes between 
blacks and whites is  
(11)    Φ[( βI’X
I* + γ’ – c’)/σB
II] − Φ[( βI’X
I* − c’)/σW
II].   
In a standard probit, we can only identify the coefficients relative to the standard 
deviation of the unobservable, so we normalize by setting the variance of the unobservable to  
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equal one.  In this case, impose the normalization for whites only, or σW
II = 1.  The parameter 
σB





II.  The normalization σW
II = 1 is equivalent to defining all of the 
coefficients in Equation 11 as their ratios relative to σW
II.  Dropping the prime subscripts to 
indicate that the coefficients are now defined in relative terms, with this normalization Equation 
11 becomes  
(11’)    Φ[(βIX
I* + γ − c)/σBR
II] − Φ[βIX
I* − c]. 
As Equation 11’ shows, without knowing σBR
II we cannot tell whether the intercepts of 
the two probits – and hence the hiring probabilities – differ because γ ≠ 0 or because σBR
II ≠ 1.  
However, if there is variation in the level of qualifications used as controls (X
I*), and these 
qualifications affect hiring outcomes, then we can identify βI/σBR
II and βI in Equation 11’, and 
the ratio of these two estimates provides an estimate of σBR
II.  This lets us test the hypothesis of 
equal standard deviations (or variances) of the unobservables.  Finally, identification of σBR
II 
implies identification of γ.  Without meaningful variation in X
I* (that is, the variation that affects 
hiring) this is not possible, since in that case all we have in the model are different intercepts 
with different parameters in both the numerators and the denominators ((γ − c)/σBR
II and c).   
The critical assumption to identify σBR
II and hence γ is that βI is the same for blacks and 
whites.  Otherwise, the ratio of the two coefficients of X
I* for blacks and whites does not identify 
σBR
II.  As HS point out, the constancy of βI is assumed in the Urban Institute studies that they 
critique, with discrimination entering through an intercept shift in the evaluation of a worker’s 
productivity, depending on their race.  It is not hard to come up with reasons why the coefficients 
relating X
I to productivity might differ by race.  For example, blacks and whites on average 
attend different schools, and if whites’ schools are higher quality, a given number of years of  
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schooling may do more to increase white productivity than black productivity.  But in a 
correspondence or audit study, it should be possible to control for these kinds of differences; for 
example, in this case one can control for the area where applicants live, and hence hold school 
district constant (for example, BM 2004).  In other words, in these field experiments the 
researcher has the capacity to generate data making it more likely that the identifying assumption 
holds.   
HS raise other possibilities.  One is that there is discrimination in evaluating particular 
attributes of a group.  For example, employers may discriminate against high-education blacks 
but not low-education blacks.  It is not possible to rule out differences in coefficients arising for 
these reasons.  Finally, HS also suggest that differences in coefficients may reflect “statistical 
information processing,” given incomplete information about productivity, as in statistical 
discrimination models.  Of course this is the idea underlying the identification strategy suggested 
above, as the difference in βI for blacks and whites is assumed to reflect precisely the accuracy 
with which X
I signals productivity for each race.  However, as discussed below, when there is 
data on multiple productivity-related characteristics, there is more one can do to test whether 
there is homogeneity in the coefficients that allows identification of σBR
II and hence γ.   
The estimation of βI/σBR
II and βI, and inference on their ratio (σBR
II = σB
II/σW
II), can be 
done via a heteroskedastic probit model (for example, Williams 2009), which allows the variance 
of the unobservable to vary with race.  To do this, pool the data for blacks and whites.  Similar to 
Equation 5, letting i denote applicants and j firms, there is a latent variable for perceived 
productivity relative to the threshold, assumed to be generated by 
(12)  T(Pij
*) = − c + βIXij
I* +  γRi + εij. 
As is standard, it is assumed that E(εij) = 0.  But the variance is assumed to follow  
15 
 
(13)  Var(εij) = [exp(µ + ωRi)]
2. 
This model can be estimated via maximum likelihood.  The observations should be 
treated as clustered on firms to obtain a variance-covariance matrix that is robust to the 
dependence of observations across firms.  The normalization μ = 0 can be imposed, given that 
there is an arbitrary normalization of the scale of the variance of one group (in this case whites, 
with Ri = 0).  Then the estimate of exp(ω) is exactly the estimate of σBR
II. 
In this heteroskedastic probit model, the assumption that βI is the same for blacks and 
whites identifies γ.
7  Observations on whites identify –c and βI, and observations on blacks 
identify (–c + γ)/exp(ω) and βI/exp(ω).  Thus, the ratio of βI/{βI/exp(ω)} identifies exp(ω), 
which, from Equation 13, is the ratio of the standard deviation of the unobservable for blacks 
relative to whites and is, as before, identified from the ratio of the effect of X
I* on blacks relative 
to its effect on whites.  With the estimate of exp(ω) (or equivalently σBR
II), along with the 
estimate of c identified from whites, the expression (–c + γ)/exp(ω) identified from blacks 
identifies γ as well.
8 
If σBR
II = 1, then there is no bias from differences in the distribution of unobservables.  
Alternatively, if σBR
II ≠ 1, but we had some evidence on how the level of standardization X
I* 
compares to the relevant population of job applicants, we could determine the direction of bias.  
For example, if the study points to discrimination and there is a bias against this finding – based 
on the estimate of the ratio of variances and information about X
I*, then the evidence of 
discrimination is not spurious, because it would be even stronger absent this bias.  But because 
we can identify γ directly under the assumptions above, we can recover an estimate of 
discrimination that is not biased by the difference in the variances of the unobservables.  And we 
can do this without determining whether X
I* used in the study is a high or low level of  
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standardization, which may be impossible to establish.   
The identification of γ and σBR
II depends on the assumption that the unobservables are 
distributed normally.  However, the approach need not be couched solely in terms of normally 
distributed unobservables and the probit specification.  What is required is the separate 
identification of the effect of race in the latent variable model and the relative variance of the 
unobservables for blacks and whites.  Although typically (for example, Maddala 1983) the logit 
model is not written with the standard deviation of the error term appearing, it is possible to 
rewrite it in this way, in which case the difference in coefficients would again be informative 
about the ratio of the variances of the unobservables (Johnson and Kotz 1970, p. 5).   
On the other hand, in the specific setting of this paper – a discrete outcome (hiring) and a 
discrete treatment (race) – there is no clear way to separately identify how race affects the latent 
variable and the variance without distributional assumptions.  This case is covered most 
explicitly in Manski (1988), who shows that when – in this context – the distribution of the 
unobservable differs by race, identification of the “structural” coefficient (γ, in this case) requires 
a parametric specification of the unobservable distribution unless various kinds of continuity 
assumptions are imposed on the distribution of the observables (with a tradeoff between the 
tightness of the restrictions on the distribution of the unobservables and on the observables); but 
the latter do not hold for a discrete treatment.
9  There is a budding literature on identification of 
variables with dichotomous outcomes with non-parametric or semi-parametric methods.  Most 
prominently, perhaps, Matzkin (1992) shows how this kind of model can be identified non-
parametrically in contexts where restrictions from economic theory (concavity, homogeneity of 
degree one) apply.  But these types of restrictions do not apply here.   
Moreover, a specific form of the hiring rule is assumed.  Different hiring rules are 
possible, such as one that minimizes the distance between a worker’s skill level and the required  
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skill level on the job (for example, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1982).  There is no claim being made 
that the identification result or the conclusions about discrimination that follow are invariant to 
different assumptions about the distribution of the unobservables or the hiring rule.  Rather than 
deriving general results, the goal is to show that, in the specific context explored by HS in which 
they showed that it was impossible to identify discrimination, an additional assumption – which 
itself has testable implications that are discussed next – permits the identification of 
discrimination.  It remains a question for future research whether it is possible to treat the data 
from a correspondence study in a less restrictive manner and still learn something about the 
effects of interest.   
The assumption that βI is the same for blacks and whites cannot be tested if there is only 
one productivity control.  With more controls, however, there is a testable restriction, because if 
the effects on hiring of multiple productivity controls differ between blacks and whites only 
because of the difference in the variance of the unobservables, the ratios of the estimated probit 
coefficients for blacks and whites, for each variable, should be the same.  Consider the case with 
two observables X
I and Z
I, modifying Equation 11’ to be  
(11’’)    Φ[( βI
BX
I* +  δI
BZ
I* +  γ − c)/σBR
II] − Φ[( βI
WX
I* +  δI
WZ
I* − c)], 
where the coefficients on the observables have B and W superscripts to denote possible 







II.  If the coefficients in Equation 11’’ do not differ by race, but only the variances 
of the unobservables differ, then   
(14)  β �I
B/βI
W = δ �I
B/δI
W. 
  In other words, the black/white ratios of the coefficients from separate probits for blacks 
and whites, or from a probit with a full set of race interactions, differ from 1 only because σBR
II ≠  
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1, and hence should be equal.  Thus, the restrictions implied by homogeneity of effects but 
unequal variances of the unobservables can be tested.  Of course failure to reject the restrictions 
does not decisively rule out the possibility that σBR
II = 1, with the coefficients differing by race 
for other reasons but Equation 14 still holding.  With a larger number of control variables, 
however, it seems unlikely that this alternative scenario would explain failure to reject the 
restrictions in Equation 14.  It is also possible to choose – as an identifying assumption – a subset 
of the observable characteristics for which Equation 14 holds, and to identify σBR
II only from the 
coefficients of this subset of variables, or to do this and then test the restriction on the other 
coefficients as overidentifying restrictions.   
  A final issue concerns the interpretation of the coefficients from the heteroskedastic 
probit model.  Consider a model with generic notation, where the latent variable depends on a 
vector of variables S and coefficients ψ, and the variance depends on a vector of variables T, 
which includes S, with coefficients θ.  The elements of S are indexed by k.  For a standard probit, 
coefficient estimates are translated into estimates of the marginal effects of a variable using  
 (15)  ∂P(hire)/∂Sk = ψkφ(Sψ), 
where Sk is the variable of interest with coefficient ψk, φ(.) is the standard normal density, and 
the standard deviation of the unobservable is normalized to one.  Typically this is evaluated at 
the means of S.  When Sk is a dummy variable such as race, the difference in the cumulative 
normal distribution functions is often used instead, although the difference is usually trivial.   
The marginal effect is more complicated in the case of the heteroskedastic probit model, 
because if the variances of the unobservable differ by race, then when race “changes” both the 
variance and the level of the latent variable that determines hiring can shift.  As long as we use 
the continuous version of the partial derivative to compute marginal effects from the 
heteroskedastic probit model, there is a natural decomposition of the effect of a change in a  
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variable Sk that also appears in T into these two components.  In particular, generalize the 
notation of Equation 13 to  
(13’)  Var(ε) = [exp(Tθ)]
2,
10 
with the variables in T arranged such that the k
th element of T is Sk.  Then the overall partial 
derivative of P(hire) with respect to Sk is   
(16)  ∂P(hire)/∂Sk = φ(Sψ/exp(Tθ))∙{(ψk – Sψ∙θk)/exp(Tθ)}.
11     
  This expression can be broken into two pieces.  First, the partial derivative with respect to 
changes in Sk affecting only the level of the latent variable – corresponding to the counterfactual 
of Sk changing the valuation of the worker without changing the variance of the unobservable – 
is equal to  
(16’)   φ(Sψ/exp(Tθ)) ∙{ψk/exp(Tθ)}.   
Second, the partial derivative with respect to changes via the variance of the 
unobservable is equal to 
(16’’)  φ(Sψ/exp(Tθ))∙{(–Sψ∙θk)/exp(Tθ)}. 
  In the analysis below, these two separate effects are reported as well as the overall 
marginal effect, and standard errors are calculated using the delta method.  The effect of race via 
how it shifts the latent variable – or how race shifts the employer’s valuation of worker 
productivity – is of greatest interest.  The point of the HS critique is that differential treatment of 
blacks and whites based only on differences in variances of the unobservable should not be 
interpreted as discrimination.  And moreover, as argued in Section VI, the effect of race via the 
latent variable captures discrimination likely to be manifested in the real economy, whereas its 





V. Evidence, Implementation, and Assessment 
A. Existing Evidence  
  As the preceding discussion shows, we need information on the effects of productivity-
related characteristics on hiring or callbacks, estimated separately for blacks and whites (or other 
groups), to identify discrimination in an audit or correspondence study, or even to assess likely 
biases.  Reporting of such evidence is rare in the literature, because these studies typically create 
one “type” of applicant for which there is only random variation in characteristics that does not 
(or is not intended to) affect outcomes.  However, BM’s well-known correspondence study of 
race discrimination is unusual in that – for reasons unrelated to the concerns of this paper – it 
uses two types of applicants.
12 
  Part of their analysis studies callback differences by race for resumes that they 
constructed to be low versus high quality, to ask whether blacks and whites have different 
incentives to invest in skills, as in Lundberg and Startz (1983).  White callback rates are higher 
for both types of resumes.  But although white callback rates increase significantly with resume 
quality (from 8.5 to 10.8 percent), black callback rates increase only slightly (from 6.2 to 6.7 
percent) and the change is not statistically significant.  Similar qualitative conclusions are 
reached based on an analysis that measures resume quality for one part of the sample based on 
the predicted probability of callbacks estimated from another part of the sample.  In this analysis, 
both groups experience an increase in callback rates from higher-quality resumes, but the effect 
is larger for whites.   
Similarly, BM report probit models estimated for whites and blacks separately (their 
Table 5).  These estimates reveal substantially stronger effects of measured qualifications for 
whites than for blacks.  Among the estimated coefficients that are statistically significant for at 
least one group, effects are larger for whites for experience,
13 having an email address, working  
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while in school, academic honors, and other special skills (such as language).  The only 
exception is for computer skills, which inexplicably have a negative effect on callback rates for 
whites.
14   
As the present paper suggests, an alternative interpretation of smaller estimated probit 
coefficients or marginal effects for blacks than for whites is a difference in the variance of the 
unobservables.  In particular, the lower coefficients for blacks are consistent with a larger 
variance for blacks, or σBR
II > 1.  If it is also true that BM standardized applicants at low levels 
of the control variables, then the HS analysis would imply that there is a bias towards finding 
discrimination in favor of blacks; that is, the evidence of discrimination against blacks would be 
even stronger absent the bias from differences in the distribution of unobservables.  BM 
explicitly state that they tried to avoid overqualification even of the higher-quality resumes (p. 
995).  But it is very difficult to assess whether the characteristics of applicants were low, since 
there is no way to identify the population of applicants.  Hence, implementation of the estimation 
procedure proposed in this paper is likely the only way even to sign the bias, let alone to recover 
an unbiased estimate of discrimination.   
B. Implementation Using Bertrand and Mullainathan Data 
Because BM’s data include applicants with different levels of qualifications, and the 
qualifications predict callbacks, their data can be used to implement the methods described 
above.  Table 1 begins by simply presenting probit estimates for the probability of a callback.  
Marginal effects are reported for specifications with no controls except a dummy variable for 
females, adding controls for the individual characteristics included on the resumes, and finally 
adding also neighborhood characteristics for the applicant’s zip code; the specific variables are 
listed in the footnote to the table.  Estimates are shown for males and females combined, and for 
females only; as the sample sizes indicate, the male sample is considerably smaller.
15  Aside  
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from the estimated effects of race, estimates are shown for a few of the resume characteristics 
capturing applicants’ qualifications.   
Echoing BM’s conclusions, there is a sizable and statistically significant difference 
between the callback rates for blacks and whites, with the rate for blacks lower by 3-3.3 
percentage points (or about 33 percent relative to the white callback rate of 9.65 percent).  The 
estimated race differences are robust to the inclusion of the different sets of control variables, 
which is what we should expect since the resume characteristics are assigned randomly.   
Interestingly, in light of the results of other audit and correspondence studies, there is no 
evidence of lower callback rates for females than for males.  And although not reported in the 
tables, this was true if the same methods used below to recover unbiased estimates of race 
discrimination were applied to the estimation of sex discrimination.  However, BM’s study was 
to a large extent focused on jobs typically held by females, and was not designed to test for sex 
discrimination.
16  Table 1 also shows that a number of the resume characteristics have 
statistically significant effects on the callback probability; this, of course, is an essential input for 
using the methods described above to recover an unbiased estimate of discrimination.  
The main analysis is reported beginning in Table 2, for the specifications with the full set 
of individual resume controls, and then adding as well the full set of neighborhood controls.  
Panel A simply repeats the estimated race effects from Table 1, for comparison.  Panel B begins 
by reporting the estimated overall marginal effects of race from the heteroskedastic probit model 
(Equation 16).  As the table shows, these estimates are slightly smaller (in absolute value) than 
the estimates from the simple probits.  They remain statistically significant and indicate callback 
rates that are lower for blacks by about 2.4-2.5 percentage points (or about 25 percent).   
Decomposing the marginal effect, the effect via the level of the latent variable is larger 
than the marginal effect from the probit estimation, ranging from −0.054 to −0.086.  The effect  
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of race via the variance of the unobservable, in contrast, is positive, ranging from 0.028 to 0.062.  
(This latter effect is not statistically significant.)  The implication is that race discrimination is 
more severe than indicated by the analysis that ignores differences in the variances of the 
unobservables.  The evidence that the probit estimates understate discrimination against blacks is 
consistent with a low level of standardization of X
I*, coupled with a higher estimated variance of 
the unobservable for blacks, as conjectured earlier based on BM’s results.  And as reported in the 
next row of the table, the estimated ratio of the standard deviation of the unobservable for blacks 
to the standard deviation for whites always exceeds one, although the difference is not 
statistically significant.  The positive effect of being black via the variance is what we expect if 
X
I* is low, since then a larger relative variance for blacks increases the relative probability that 
they are hired (called back).   
The next two rows of the table report diagnostic test statistics.  First, the p-values from 
the test of the overidentifying restrictions (Equation 14) are shown, based on probit 
specifications interacting all of the controls with race.  In all four cases the restrictions are not 
rejected, with p-values ranging from 0.17 to 0.62.  Nonetheless, the lower end of this range of p-
values suggests that the restrictions sometimes might be fairly inconsistent with the data.  As a 
consequence, below some alternative estimates are discussed that use only a subset of variables, 
for which Equation 14 is more consistent with the data, to identify discrimination.   
Finally, the subset of control variables for which the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient for whites exceeded that for blacks – consistent with the larger standard deviation of 
unobservables for blacks – was identified.  Then the heteroskedastic probit model was estimated 
leaving the race interactions of the other variables in the model – so that the restrictions from 
Equation 14 that were less consistent with the data were not imposed – and the joint significance 
of these latter variables was tested.  Despite this latter subset of variables having estimated  
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coefficients less consistent with the restrictions in Equation 14, the p-values indicate that these 
interactions can also be excluded from the model.  This can be viewed as an overidentifying test 
of the restriction that there are no differences in the effects of any of the control variables by 
race, for the specifications for which the estimates are reported in the first row of Panel B.  
Although technically it is only necessary to assume that there is a single variable for which the 
coefficient is the same for blacks and whites, there is no obvious variable to choose for the 
purposes of identification; here, instead, I let the data select a set of variables more consistent 
with the identifying restriction.   
Table 3 follows up on the last procedure, by instead simply dropping from the analysis 
the control variables for which the absolute value of the estimated coefficient for whites was less 
than for blacks.  Given that the control variables are random with respect to race, dropping 
controls does not introduce bias.  As we would expect, the p-values for the tests of this set of 
restrictions are now much closer to one, ranging from 0.68 to 0.92, compared with a range of 
0.17 to 0.62 in Table 2.  However, as the table shows, the estimated effects of race are similar to 
those in Table 2 and do not point to any different conclusions.     
C. Monte Carlo Assessment  
A Monte Carlo assessment of how well the estimation procedure proposed in this paper 
works in terms of removing the bias in estimates of discrimination from correspondence study 
evidence was carried out.  The Monte Carlo assessment uses simulated data of the type needed to 
implement the estimator – namely, data with applicants at two different levels of productivity.  
The analysis is described in detail in Appendix 1; here the findings are briefly summarized.   
First, using simulated data either with or without discrimination, the heteroskedastic 
estimation procedure eliminates the bias, and recovers an unbiased estimate of discrimination.  
(And as a benchmark, the simulated data are used to replicate the HS critique, showing that a  
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simple probit analysis can generate bias in any direction.)  Second, for a specific case we 
consider, when the identifying assumption is violated and the coefficient on the productivity-
related characteristic in the simulated data is not equal for blacks and whites, but is treated as 
equal in the estimation, there are two findings.  When there is no discrimination, the 
misspecification has no effect; the estimator still produces estimates of γ centered on zero.  When 
there is discrimination and the model is misspecified, there is bias but it is multiplicative, so the 
estimator will not generate the wrong sign for the estimate of γ.   
VI. The Meaning of Discrimination 
The fact that a correspondence study can generate evidence of discrimination when γ = 0 
raises the question of whether the evidence reflects a different kind of discrimination.  In this 
case, the productivity of blacks and whites are regarded equally by employers (or equivalently 
there is no taste discrimination).  Moreover, employers are not making any assumption about 
mean differences in unobservables between blacks and whites.  However, they are making 
assumptions about distributional differences with regard to the variance of unobservables, and it 
is these assumptions that lead them, given the level of standardization of the study applicants, to 
prefer blacks or whites – which might be labeled “second-moment” statistical discrimination.   
The HS critique can be recast as showing that the analysis of data from a standard audit 
or correspondence study cannot distinguish between discrimination as it usually interpreted, and 
discrimination based on different variances of unobservables.  Indeed Manski’s (1988) paper 
discussed earlier, in the context of identification, makes this same point, noting that we can 
estimate the “reduced-form” effect of a binary treatment variable on a binary outcome without 
strong assumptions, but not the “structural” effect.  The present paper imposes an assumption to 
identify the structural parameter γ, distinguishing between what is typically viewed as 
discrimination (stemming from tastes or, as noted earlier, from standard statistical  
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discrimination) and different treatment stemming from differences in variances of the 
unobservable. 
A natural question, then, is whether the structural effect of race, captured in γ, is of 
interest, or whether instead all we want to know is the reduced-form effect of race – that is, how 
race affects the probability of hiring whether because employers discount black workers’ 
productivity (for example) or because employers treat blacks and whites differentially because of 
different distributions of the unobservable.  There are two reasons why the structural coefficient 
γ is important.  First, to the best of my knowledge, differential treatment based on assumptions 
(true or not) about variances are not viewed as discriminatory in the legal literature.
17  Thus, 
identification of γ speaks to the discrimination that is most clearly illegal.     
The second and more compelling argument is that taste discrimination or “first-moment” 
statistical discrimination, captured in γ, generalizes from the correspondence study to the real 
economy.  In contrast, the second-moment statistical discrimination is an artifact of how a 
correspondence study is done – in particular, the standardization of applicants to particular, and 
similar, values of the observables, relative to the actual distribution of observables among real 
applicants to these firms.   
Suppose that the actual population of applicants to the employers included in a 
correspondence study comes from a large range of values of X
I.  Then the different distributions 
of the unobservables by race can have strong effects on hiring outcomes in the correspondence 
study because in the study the applicants are standardized to a narrow range of X
I.  In that sense, 
the differential treatment by race is strongly influenced by the design of the correspondence 
study, rather than by behavior of real firms evaluating real applicants, and can be generated 
solely from the standardization of applicants in a narrow range of X
I; in that sense, 




18  In contrast, the structural effect of race via the latent variable would generalize to 
how the firms in the correspondence study, and presumably similar firms, evaluate actual job 
applicants and make hiring decisions.   
VII. Conclusions and Discussion 
Many researchers view audit and correspondence studies as the most compelling way to 
test for labor market discrimination.  And research applying these methods to many different 
types of groups nearly always finds evidence of discrimination.  The use of audit studies to test 
for labor market discrimination has been criticized on numerous grounds having to do with 
whether applicants from different groups appear identical to employers.  Many of these 
criticisms can be countered by using correspondence studies of fictitious applicants on paper 
rather than fictitious in-person applicants.   
However, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) show that even in correspondence studies in 
which group averages are identical conditional on the controls, group differences in the variances 
of unobservable dimensions of productivity can invalidate the empirical tests, leading to spurious 
evidence of discrimination in either direction, or spurious evidence of an absence of 
discrimination.  This is a fundamental criticism of correspondence studies, as it implies that 
evidence regarding discrimination from even the best-designed correspondence study can be 
misleading.  Nonetheless, this criticism has been ignored in the literature.  
This paper shows that if a correspondence study includes observable measures of 
variation in applicants’ quality that affect hiring outcomes, an unbiased estimate of 
discrimination can be recovered even when there are group differences in the variances of the 
unobservable.  The method is applied to Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2004) correspondence 
study, and leads to stronger evidence of race discrimination that adversely affects blacks than is 
obtained when differences in the variances of the unobservable are ignored.  Moreover, this  
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conclusion is bolstered by Monte Carlo simulations suggesting that the estimation procedure 
performs well, eliminating the problems highlighted by Heckman and Siegelman that could 
otherwise lead to badly misleading conclusions from the analysis of data from correspondence 
(or audit) studies. 
Finally, it should be recognized that the method proposed here can be easily implemented 
in any future correspondence (or audit) study.  All that is needed is for the resumes or applicants 
to include some variation in characteristics that affect the probability of being hired.
19  This is 
different from what is often done in designing these studies, where researchers try to create a 
pool of equally-qualified applicants.  All that needs to be done is to intentionally create resumes 
of different quality.  Once a researcher confirms that a set of productivity-related characteristics 
on the resumes affected hiring outcomes, it should then be possible – conditional on an 
identifying assumption that has testable implications – to detect discrimination.   
Appendix 1. Monte Carlo Assessment  
This appendix provides Monte Carlo evidence on how well the estimation procedure 
proposed in this paper works in terms of removing the bias in estimates of discrimination from 
correspondence study evidence, and explores the consequences of violation of the identifying 
assumption.  Figure A1 replicates the basic result from Heckman (1998), showing that probit 
analysis of the data from a correspondence study can generate substantial bias in either direction.  








20 and there is no discrimination (γ = 0).  For the Monte Carlo simulations, 
the assumed data generating process is X
I* ~ N(0,1), XB
II ~ N(0,1), XW
II ~ N(0,2.25).  Paralleling 
the standardization of correspondence study applicants, the data are generated by sampling X
I* 
from a truncated normal distribution, in steps of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*).  The simulation is done 100 
times at each value of X
I* shown in the graph, with samples of 2,000 blacks and 2,000 whites in  
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each simulation (roughly BM’s sample sizes), and a probit model is estimated for each simulated 
data set.  The panels in the figure show – for both the estimates of γ and the marginal effects – 
the true values based on the assumed parameters, and the means based on the estimates.
21   
The upper figures clearly illustrate that, despite the absence of discrimination in the data 
generating process (the true effect is constant at 0), the evidence can either point to 
discrimination against blacks or discrimination in favor of blacks, depending on the level of 
standardization of X
I*.  The marginal effects show that even though there is no discrimination in 
the data generating process, quite strong evidence of discrimination in either direction can 
emerge, with a marginal effect of −0.1 (0.1) for low (high) values of X
I*.  Finally, as we would 
expect, only at X
I* = 0 is the estimate of γ (and the marginal effect) unbiased.  The lower panels 
of Figure A1 report the same kind of evidence when γ = −0.5, consistent with discrimination.  A 
similar result is apparent, with substantial bias relative to the true γ or the true marginal effect.  
The heteroskedastic probit estimation requires data with multiple levels of the value of 
X
I* at which applicants are standardized.  As an intermediate step to separate the consequences 
of generating the data this way, and the consequences of implementing the heteroskedastic probit 
estimator, Figure A2 shows results with such generated data, but continuing to use the probit 
specification.  X
I* is now sampled from two truncated normal distributions, one using X
I*in steps 
of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*), as before, and the second using instead X
I* + 0.5, again in steps of 0.1 + 
0.1∙SD(X
I*).  Figure A2 shows qualitatively similar results to Figure A1, so simply using data 
with variation in productivity-related characteristics does not, in itself, eliminate the bias.  
Nonetheless, the biases in both the no discrimination and discrimination cases are a bit smaller 
than in Figure A1 because of the larger range covered by X
I*.
22    
Figure A3 reports results for the heteroskedastic probit estimation, using the same data 
generating process for simulating data as in Figure A2, although in this case 5,000 simulations  
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are run for each pair of values of X
I* because the heteroskedastic probit estimation is less precise 
than the simple probit estimation.  The top panel covers the no discrimination case (γ = 0).  The 
left-hand graph shows the means of the true and estimated values of the marginal effects for each 
value of X
I*.  These are largely indistinguishable in the figure, indicating no bias.  The right-hand 
panel provides evidence on the distribution of the estimates, showing the distance between the 
25
th and 75
th percentiles of the estimates and between the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles at each 
value of X
I*.  The distribution of estimates is quite tight at levels of standardization near the 
center of the distribution of X
I*, but becomes wider at more extreme values, when hiring rates in 
the generated data move towards zero or one.  The discrimination case (γ = −0.5) similarly 
demonstrates that the heteroskedastic probit estimation eliminates the bias.   
The last analysis, reported in Figure A4, considers the implications of the data generating 
process violating the identifying assumption that the coefficient(s) on the productivity-related 
characteristics are equal for blacks and whites.  Results are presented for two cases: mild 
violation in which the coefficient on X
I* (βI) is slightly larger for whites than for blacks (1.1 
versus 1); and strong violation in which it is much larger (2 versus 1).  As Figure A4 shows, in 
the case of no discrimination – the left-hand panels – the results are indistinguishable from when 
the identifying assumption is not violated.  In contrast, in the discrimination case the estimated 
marginal effects become more negative than the true effects over much of the range, only slightly 
with mild violation of the identifying assumption, but more so when the violation is more 
pronounced.   
The implications of what happens when the identifying assumption is violated in this 
specific setting make sense, thinking about how γ is identified.  Using estimates of the separate 
probits in Equations 10 and 10’, the ratio of the standardized white probit coefficient to the black 
probit coefficient identifies σBR
II (which equals σB
II/σW
II).  When the true value of βI is larger for  
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whites than for blacks, but it is assumed that they are equal, σBR
II is overestimated.  For example, 
in the case in the top panel of Figure A4, the ratio of coefficients is (βI∙1.1)/(βI/σBR
II) = 1.1∙σBR
II.  
Recall from the earlier discussion that the probit for blacks identifies (–c + γ)/exp(ω) = (–c + 
γ)/σBR
II.  Because c = 0 in the simulations, we identify γ by multiplying the estimate of this 
expression by the estimate of σBR
II; the upward bias in the estimate of σBR
II therefore implies that 
the estimate of γ is biased away from zero.  In the no discrimination case, when γ = 0, this is 
irrelevant; multiplying an estimate that averages zero by the upward-biased estimate of σBR
II has 
no effect.  But when the true γ is non-zero (and negative), this bias leads to an estimate of γ that 
is more negative.  When γ is more negative, we get exactly the “bending” of the estimated 
marginal effects that the right-hand panels of Figure A4 illustrate.
23  A violation of the 
assumption in the opposite direction (βI larger for blacks) would lead to biases in the opposite 
direction.  Nonetheless, it follows from this reasoning that the bias is multiplicative, and hence 
does not generate the wrong sign for the estimate of γ, or generate spurious evidence of 
discrimination when there is no discrimination.  However, further analysis shows that when c ≠ 0 
(or, more generally, when c is not equal to the expected value of unobserved productivity), the 
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Table 1 
Probit Estimates for Callbacks: Basic Results 
  Males and females    Females 
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 


















  …  …  … 
Selected individual  
resume controls 
             











































               
Other controls:               
Individual resume 
characteristics 
  X  X      X  X 
Neighborhood 
characteristics 
    X        X 
               
Mean callback rate  .080  .080  .080    .082  .082  .082 
N  4,784  4,784  4,784    3,670  3,670  3,670 
Note: Marginal effects using Equation 15 are reported.  Standard errors are computed 
clustering on the ad to which the applicants responded, and are reported in parentheses; 
the delta method is used to compute standard errors for the marginal effects.  Individual 
resume characteristics include bachelor’s degree, experience and its square, volunteer 
activities, military service, having an email address, gaps in employment history, work 
during school, academic honors, computer skills, and other special skills.  Neighborhood 
characteristics include the fraction high school dropout, college graduate, black, and 
white, as well as log median household income, in the applicant’s zip code.     
 
Table 2 
Heteroskedastic Probit Estimates for Callbacks: Full Specifications 
  Males and females    Females 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
A. Estimates from basic probit (Table 1)           








           
B. Heteroskedastic probit model           










           
















           










           
Wald test statistic, null hypothesis that ratio 









           
Wald test statistic, null hypothesis that ratios 
of coefficients for whites relative to blacks  


















           
Test overidentifying restrictions: include in 
heteroskedastic probit model interactions 
for variables with |white coefficient| < 
|black coefficient|, Wald test for joint 





















Number of overidentifying restrictions  3  6    2  6 
           
Other controls:           
Individual resume characteristics  X  X    X  X 
Neighborhood characteristics    X      X 
           
N  4,784  4,784    3,670  3,670 
Note: See notes to Table 1.  In the first row of Panel B the marginal effects in Equation 16 are 
reported, with the decomposition in Equations 16’ and 16’’ immediately below; the marginal 
effects are evaluated at sample means.  The standard errors for the two components of the marginal 
effects are computed using the delta method.  Test statistics are based on the variance-covariance 
matrix clustering on the ad to which the applicants responded.  Individual resume characteristics 




Heteroskedastic Probit Estimates for Callbacks: Restricted Specifications Using only Controls with 
Absolute Value of Estimated Effect in Fully Interactive Probit Model Larger for Whites than 
Blacks  
  Males and females    Females 
  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
A. Estimates from basic probit            








           
B. Heteroskedastic probit model           








           
















           










           
Wald test statistic, null hypothesis that ratio 









           
Wald test statistic, null hypothesis that ratios 
of coefficients for whites relative to blacks  


















           
Other controls:           
Individual resume characteristics  X  X    X  X 
Neighborhood characteristics    X      X 
           
N  4,784  4,784    3,670  3,670 
Notes: See notes to Tables 1 and 2.   
 
No discrimination (γ = 0)  
 
Probit estimates of γ                            Probit estimates of marginal effect of black 
           
        
 
Discrimination (γ = -.5) 
 
Probit estimates of γ                            Probit estimates of marginal effect of black 
           
Notes: Left-hand graphs shows true γ and mean estimated γ.  Right-hand graphs show marginal effects, evaluated at sample 
means for simulated data.  In the data generating process, X
I* ~ N(0,1), XB
II ~ N(0,1), XW





II are unobservable); βI = 1 and c = 0 for both blacks and whites.  Estimates are generated by Monte Carlo 
simulation, drawing 4,000 observations (2,000 white and 2,000 black) from truncated normal distribution at each value of X
I* (in 
steps of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*)) and estimating probit model.  Simulation is done 100 times at each value of X




Replication of Heckman (Figure 1, 1998), and Monte Carlo Simulations of Estimates of Marginal Effects from 
Simple Probit Estimation   
 
No discrimination (γ = 0)  
 
Probit estimates of γ                             Probit estimates of marginal effect of black 
                 
        
 
Discrimination (γ = -.5) 
 
Probit estimates of γ                             Probit estimates of marginal effect of black 
         
Notes: See notes to Figure A1.  The only difference is as follows: Estimates are generated by Monte Carlo simulation, drawing 
4,000 observations (2,000 white and 2,000 black) observations from two truncated normal distributions (one at each value of 
X
I* (in steps of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*)), and one at each value of X
I* + .5
 (again in steps of 0.1) + 0.1∙SD(X
I*)), and estimating probit 




Monte Carlo Simulations of Probit Estimates and Marginal Effects from Simple Probit Estimation with Two 
Types of Applicants  
 
No discrimination (γ = 0) 
 
Estimates of marginal effects of black                      Distribution of estimates 
          
 
Discrimination (γ = -.5) 
 
Estimates of marginal effects of black                      Distribution of estimates 
          
Notes: Left-hand graphs show mean true and estimated marginal effects of being black, evaluated at sample means for 
simulated data.  Right-hand graphs show distributions of estimates.  The marginal effects shown correspond to the effect 
of race on the latent variable, as in Equation 16’.  Estimates are generated by Monte Carlo simulation, drawing 4,000 
observations (2,000 white and 2,000 black) observations from two truncated normal distributions (one at each value of X
I* 
(in steps of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*)), and one at each value of X
I* + .5
 (again in steps of 0.1 + 0.1∙SD(X
I*)), and estimating 
heteroskedastic probit model.  Simulation is done 5,000 times at each value of X
I* shown in graph.  As in Figure A1, the 
data generating process has X
I* ~ N(0,1), XB
II ~ N(0,1), XW
II ~ N(0,2.25), so Var(XW
II)/Var(XB
II) = 2.25 (XW
II and XB
II are 




Monte Carlo Simulations of Heteroskedastic Probit Estimation, Estimates of Marginal Effects and 
Distributions  
 
Mild violation of identifying assumption in data generating process (βI for whites = 1.1) 
 
No discrimination (γ = 0)                            Discrimination (γ = -.5) 
                     
     
Strong violation of identifying assumption in data generating process (βI for whites = 2) 
 
No discrimination (γ = 0)                            Discrimination (γ = -.5) 
                         
Notes: See notes to Figure A3.  The only difference is that βI is unequal for blacks and whites; it is always equal to 1 for 




Monte Carlo Simulations of Heteroskedastic Probit Estimation, with Model Misspecification Masking 









1 In the ensuing discussion X
I is observable and X
II unobservable.  I put a coefficient on X
I in 
Equation 2 because X
I has a definable scale, whereas I treat X
II as scaled such that its coefficient 
equals one.  Following HS, I assume that the coefficient on X
I is the same for blacks and whites, 
so discrimination is reflected only in an intercept difference.  I return to this issue later.     
2 We could include resume characteristics, which should not matter for the estimate of γ’ since 
they are randomly assigned by race.  The same is true of firm fixed effects, which are orthogonal 
to race.  
3 As discussed below, some characteristics of workers not controlled by the researcher are 
observed by the employer in an audit study; but many are not.  
4 This is more problematic in correspondence studies of age discrimination, because even with 
many other qualifications on the resumes, if researchers give older applicants the same amount 
of experience as younger applicants, employers are likely to make adverse assumptions about 
older applicants whose resumes reflect limited work experience.  See Lahey (2008) and Riach 
and Rich (2007) for suggestions for addressing this problem in age discrimination studies.     
5 We can treat F as statistically independent because resume characteristics are, or should be, 
assigned randomly (for example, Lahey and Beasley 2009).  And we can always think about X
II 
as the variation in unobserved productivity that is orthogonal to X
I. 
6 Heckman (1998, footnote 7) suggests that the case with a low level of standardization and 
higher dispersion for whites “seems to rationalize” audit study evidence of discrimination against 
blacks.  It is not clear, however, that we know either the level of standardization or the relative 
dispersion of unobserved productivity.  Even though the first issue relates to observables, there is 
no obvious way to compare the distributions of qualifications of testers in an audit study to the 
population of job applicants.  In fact, there are two conflicting tendencies in setting standards for  
 
 
audit studies.  Setting a low standard implies that call-back rates will be low, reducing the 
statistical power of the evidence.  But setting a standard too high raises concerns about 
“overqualification” of candidates (for example, BM 2004, p. 995), which in an economic context 
presumably means that the job applicant will be expected to get better job offers,  deterring 
employers from making offers.   
7 Conversely, the following argument can be easily modified to show that if βI is not the same for 
blacks and whites, then γ is unidentified.  The assumption that only race shifts the variance of the 
unobservable (Equation 13) is less consequential, since in a correspondence (or audit) study the 
observed characteristics of applicants other than race are essentially the same.    
8 Consistent with the earlier discussion of statistical discrimination, we might want to allow for 
the possibility that E(XB
II) – E(XW
II) ≠ 0.  In this case, we can normalize by assuming E(XW
II) = 
0 and defining E(XB
II) – E(XW
II) = μBW
II.  We can then replace γ in the preceding identification 
argument with γ + μBW
II, and it is this sum of parameters, reflecting the combination of taste 
discrimination and the expected mean difference in the unobservable (statistical discrimination), 
which is identified.   
9 Some of the other controls on the resumes may be continuous, but they do not contribute to 
identification of the effect of race on the latent variable given that they are, by construction, 
orthogonal to race.  By way of contrast, in audit-type studies of discrimination on a continuous 
outcome – such as price quotes for cars or car repairs (Goldberg 1996; Gneezy and List 2004) – 
the identification problem is simpler.   
10 Recall that μ in Equation 13 is normalized to zero.  
11 See Cornelißen (2005).  
 
 
12 BM actually study differences in treatment between applicants with black-sounding names and 
names that do not sound black.  For simplicity, I discuss the results as if they capture differences 
between blacks and whites, which is certainly a plausible interpretation of their findings.    
13 This variable enters as a quadratic, and the effect of experience is stronger for whites up to 
about 16 years of experience, more than twice the mean in their sample.   
14 Also, the effect of gaps in employment is inexplicably positive, but not significant for 
estimates disaggregated by race. 
15 Probits estimated for males only yielded similar results for the effects of race, although the 
estimated coefficients of some of the productivity-related characteristics were quite imprecise or 
had unexpected signs.  In estimating the heteroskedastic probit model for males, in some cases 
there were computational problems, likely reflecting these other issues regarding the estimates 
for males, and perhaps also the much smaller sample for males.     
16 They study sales, administrative support, clerical, and customer service jobs.  The male 
applicants were used almost exclusively for the sales jobs, so the sex difference is identified 
mainly from the sales jobs.   
17 There is a small economics literature that studies discrimination based on second moments – in 
particular the variance of productivity – where a group with higher variance may be penalized 
because of risk aversion on the part of employers.  The idea goes back to Aigner and Cain 
(1977).  Dickinson and Oaxaca (2009) provide an experimental study of this type of 
discrimination in labor markets.     
18 One could imagine more complicated scenarios in which different firms engage in strategies 
that draw applicants from different parts of the distribution, in which case it is harder to  
 
 
characterize how differences in the distribution of unobservables by race will impact the 
treatment of whites versus blacks.   
19 In principle this can be done in an audit study as well a correspondence study, although it is 
much harder to generate large samples in audit studies.  
20 This is the ratio of the variances of the unobservables.  Note that a larger value for whites is 
the opposite of the common assumption in models of statistical discrimination.     
21 The true marginals are based on the heteroskedastic probit specification (Equation 16’), 
because the simulated data are heteroskedastic.  The true marginal effect is reported as a mean 
because it is computed once using each simulated data set, holding the parameters fixed, and 
then averaged. 
22 In this case the unbiased estimate occurs at the value of −0.25 (for X
I*) on the horizontal axis, 
where the average of the upper and lower standardization levels equals zero.  The reduction in 
bias is a little less clear in the discrimination case.  To clarify, the bias in Figures A1 and A2 
should be contrasted at comparable values of X
I*, given that Figure A2 shows the mean estimates 
at the lower level of standardization of X
I*.  For example, for the discrimination case, the mean 
estimate of γ at X
I* = 1 in Figure A1 should be compared to the mean estimate at X
I* = 0.75 in 
Figure A2 (in which case this is the lower standardization level and the average is 1); the latter 
estimate is in fact closer to zero.   
23 In the standard marginal effect – ψkφ(Sψ), from Equation 15 – nearer the center of the 
distribution the larger estimate of ψk dominates the marginal effect, whereas nearer the tails the 
larger estimate of ψk lowers φ(Sψ) enough that the product ψkφ(Sψ)  is closer to zero.   